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To my mother, Kirsten,
and to the memory of my father, Jørgen
Preface
In Denmark, in the late 1990s, I first became interested in metaphysics of states of
affairs, or state of affairs ontology, when as a student at the University of
Copenhagen I read Armstrong’s Universals and Scientific Realism. The focus of his
work is the problem of universals; yet, in Armstrong’s positive theory, the meta-
physics of states of affairs is the (underdeveloped) linchpin. It is also the most
fascinating part, I found. How excited I was when I then discovered that his A
World of States of Affairs was forthcoming! But I felt that Armstrong was focusing
too much on states of affairs’ relation to other topics, such as causation, modality
and numbers, whereas I wanted to delve into them directly, as it were.
In England, where I had soon afterwards gone to pursue my interest, I learned
that I could not just dive straight into states of affairs. The principal access to them
is as truthmakers, which is their main ontological role. Though I am no longer so
certain about this view, there is no doubt in my mind that a state of affairs ontology
worth its salt needs to offer a plausible story about the role of truthmaking and how
states of affairs play that role. What is more, truthmaking has two major bonuses. It
can be used to define a notion of reducibility which is at the heart of the state of
affairs ontology to be developed in this book. This notion is, roughly speaking,
equivalent to Armstrong’s notion of supervenience. And it can be used to defend a
state of affairs ontology that, in the spirit of logical atomism, postulates no
non-atomic states of affairs.
I shall defend the position that states of affairs are complexes that are instanti-
ations of properties or relations by particulars. In order for this view to be plausible,
four things, among others, need to be secured. First, something like logical atomism
(probably) needs to be true. As we shall see, it is (if a solution for negative truths
can be found, an issue I cannot address in the present book). Second, and more
importantly, the particulars in states of affairs should be bare particulars. Third, and
more importantly still, states of affairs, the complexes, should be unified without
giving rise to Bradley’s regress. Fourth, state of affairs ontology should work better
than its competitors. I argue for the first and fourth points in Part I of the book, and
for the second and third in Parts II and III, respectively.
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The book includes an introductory chapter followed by nine chapters divided into
three parts: Part I on the main role for state of affairs ontology, and its two rivals;
Part II on the constituents of states of affairs; and Part III on the unity of states of
affairs. Here, I shall summarize a number of main points from each chapter.
Chapter 1: Introduction
I introduce the book as a whole, the nature of my project and its context. In
particular, I introduce the main thesis of the book, the thesis of my state of affairs
ontology, viz. that states of affairs are unified complexes that are instantiations of
properties or relations by particulars. The book continues the important tradition
of the metaphysics of states of affairs in analytic philosophy, as found in influential
philosophers such as Russell, Wittgenstein, Bergmann, Grossmann, Armstrong and,
more recently, William Vallicella. The chapter outlines the book’s general
approach, assumptions and restrictions. First, the general approach can to a large
extent be described as Armstrongian: Armstrong, in his middle-period, is the
philosopher who has been the single greatest inspiration for the state of affairs
ontology I advocate. Second, I formulate assumptions which I shall appeal to
throughout the book, including ‘Lewis’s Razor’, what I call the Principle of
Spatiotemporally Homogeneous Composition, and my view that properties and
relations in states of affairs are universals (if trope theory and moderate realism fail,
which I argue in Chaps. 3 and 4 that they do). Third, I restrict myself to contingent
states of affairs about concreta, and I remain neutral with regard to endurantism
versus perdurantism in the philosophy of time. I next introduce in some detail the
main problem for state of affairs ontology, the problem of unity, a topic that
occupies centre stage in much of Part III of the book, i.e. in Chaps. 9 and 10. This is
the problem of how states of affairs are unified. I further introduce the main role for
states of affairs, namely, truthmaking. Although the next chapter is devoted to
exploring this notion, I distance myself from Armstrong’s well-known truthmaker
argument for states of affairs, since I am not professing to be ‘arguing for the
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existence of states of affairs’. Another position on which states of affairs are also
closely linked to truthmaking is Arianna Betti’s. I consider and reject her criticism
of states of affairs at the end of the chapter.
Part I—The Main Role for State of Affairs Ontology, and Its two
Rivals
Chapter 2: Truthmaking
I first argue that truthmaking is the principal role for state of affairs ontology. I also
compare truthmaking with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, since this can illumi-
nate it considerably. I next compare three competing approaches to truthmaking and
defend the one which goes most naturally with state of affairs ontology, what is
usually called ‘truthmaker maximalism’. I further argue that, in the spirit of logical
atomism, we need no non-atomic truthmakers for (fully) positive truths (fromwhich it
follows that we need no corresponding non-atomic states of affairs). I also provide a
brief quasi-definition of truthmaking it—‘quasi’, as it is arguably too fundamental to
be defined properly—and characterize it implicitly. It is easy to show that truth-
making on this view leads to problems when applied to necessary truths. I explain
why and how I am nonetheless going to do this at a later point, in Sect. 7.1.1, for the
case of truths about internal relations. I finally use truthmaking for defining a highly
important notion of reducibility, ‘truthmaking-reducibility’ or ‘TM-reducibility’,
which I shall apply frequently at central points throughout the book. It is, roughly, the
equivalent of Armstrong’s ‘supervenience’. Candidates for a certain kind of entity are
included in (constituents of) states of affairs if and only if they are not TM-reducible.
For example, I shall argue in Chap. 6 that negative and disjunctive properties are
TM-reducible; and in Chap. 7 that the same goes for non-external relations. Thus,
states of affairs which include these entities, which Armstrong calls ‘second- or
third-class states of affairs’, are in my view merely apparent states of affairs.
Chapter 3: A Partial Look at Trope Theory
The first part of this chapter deals with I call ‘basic trope theory’. This theory comes
in two main versions: a ‘bundle version’ and a ‘substance-attribute version’. Keith
Campbell, the main proponent of basic trope theory in the bundle version, holds
that a trope has both a ‘particularity’ and a ‘nature’, but that it is nonetheless simple.
This feature may help trope theory solve (its counterpart of) the problem of unity,
but it seems enigmatic: how can something simple ‘ground’ entirely distinct things.
If this problem cannot be solved, trope theory seems incoherent. Besides, when we
consider how basic trope theory in the bundle version handles truthmaking, it can
be seen to fail. I argue that this version of trope theory needs a relation of ‘com-
presence’, and hence that it requires states of affairs in order to provide truthmakers.
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(I additionally argue tentatively that although the substance-attribute version of
trope theory does not require states of affairs to account for truthmaking, it fails for
other reasons.) In the second part of the chapter, I briefly consider more advanced
versions of trope theory, but argue that they face fatal problems in accounting for
either ‘non-substantial change’ or predication.
Chapter 4: A Partial Look at Moderate Realism
This chapter is on Donald Mertz’s ‘moderate realism’. Since Mertz’s metaphysics is
unfamiliar to most philosophers, a fair amount of the chapter is expository and aims
to reflect his distinctive terminology and notation, but the main overall purpose is
nonetheless to evaluate this ontology. Moderate realism attempts to build unity into
complexes, as it were; at its heart are ‘relation instances’ which are also known as
‘unit attributes’. Relation instances are simple, yet ‘internally diverse’; they are
‘non-composite wholes’ analogously to how a circle is ‘simple in its continuity’,
according to Mertz. I call Mertz’s relation instances ‘MR-facts’ and show both how
they can constitute ordinary objects and be truthmakers. Mertz claims they can
solve his counterpart of the problem of unity. However, MR-facts are essentially
relational, which creates insurmountable problems for the monadic case. What is
more, as I argue in the final part of the chapter, the fact that relation instances are
‘non-composite wholes’ is Mertz’s counterpart of Campbell’s thesis that tropes are
simple and as such highly implausible.
Part II—The Constituents of States of Affairs
Chapter 5: Bare Particulars
I argue that the particulars in states of affairs are bare particulars. That indeed is
why the chapter is entitled ‘Bare Particulars’: it is about particulars qua constituents
of states of affairs, not about particulars as such. Ironically, however, on the view of
bare particulars I defend, conjunctions of states of affairs are identical to ordinary
particulars (‘thick particulars’). Despite its being a common view that the partic-
ulars in states of affairs are bare—and an almost equally common view that bare
particulars are absurd entities—it is far from clear what bare particulars are;
specifically, what their bareness is. The main purpose of the chapter is twofold:
(i) to give a viable account for what the bareness of bare particulars is, and
(ii) examine some of their roles in states of affairs or related entities. As to (i), I look
at some proposals from the literature, and argue that they fail. Instead, I defend the
view that the bareness of bare particulars is that they instantiate, as opposed to
include, their properties. As to (ii), I argue that bare particulars individuate thick
particulars; and that they are the reason for the particularity of states of affairs (‘the
victory of particularity’). In the last section of the chapter, I put forward an in my
view very important argument that particulars in states of affairs are always bare,
what I call the generalization argument.
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Chapter 6: Properties
The chief purpose of this chapter is to find out which properties, among certain
kinds of candidate, are (i) constituents of states of affairs, (ii) which of these are not
constituents of states of affairs, and (iii) to discern how the former behave when
hosted by states of affairs. A natural starting point when embarking on an exami-
nation of properties is the relationship between properties and predicates. I argue
with Armstrong that this relationship is non-trivial, and I endorse his division of
properties into three ‘classes’. However, this classification does not by itself tell us
whether a certain property is, or is not, TM-irreducible. We need to know this to
find out which properties are constituents of states of affairs. I therefore discuss four
kinds of property that are, I shall argue, not TM-irreducible: negative, disjunctive,
unique qualitative properties (such as ‘being the last dodo’) and conjunctive
properties. Armstrong agrees with my assessment of first three kinds, but not the
last one. I argue, following Mellor’s argument from ‘Ramsey’s test’, that con-
junctive properties, contrary to what Armstrong holds, are TM-reducible.
Additional issues discussed in this chapter are the individuation of properties
(universals) and Mertz’s argument against states of affairs with universals.
Chapter 7: Relations
The subject of relations is vast and is receiving increasing attention, and this chapter
can only touch on a few aspects of the topic. The chapter’s aim is fourfold. First, as
demonstrated in the previous chapter, some properties are TM-reducible and hence
not constituents of monadic states of affairs. Similarly, some relations are
TM-reducible and hence not constituents of polyadic states of affairs. Accordingly,
I draw what I consider the most important distinction for this issue, namely, the
distinction between internal, external and ‘grounded’ relations and argue that only
external relations are not TM-reducible. Second, I defend relations, whether
TM-reducible or not, against a neglected but potentially devastating objection to
them by Panayot Butchvarov. Third, relying on Grossmann and, in particular, on
Armstrong, I sketch a ‘directionalist’ account of the direction (‘order’) of
non-symmetrical relations. This account enables me to provide ‘identity conditions’
for states of affairs. A state of affairs ontology worth its salt should be able to supply
these goods, although as we shall see, there is relatively little that needs to be said
about the issue. Fourth, I examine the phenomenon of reflexivity and argue that
reflexive relations are TM-reducible. This matter is not only interesting in itself, but
it is also important for later contrasting reflexivity with self-relating, a notion which
is at the heart of my solution to the problem of unity and which I shall introduce in
Chap. 9.
Chapter 8: Concrete Universals
This is a relatively brief chapter concerned with a requirement of both naturalism
and the Principle of Spatiotemporally Homogeneous Composition, namely, that
universals in states of affairs be concrete. The view that universals are concrete is
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not exactly a popular view; it is often assumed as a matter of course that they are
abstract, and there is no shortage of arguments against it. I briefly discuss some
of them, including arguments by Douglas Ehring, Herbert Hochberg, James
Moreland and Ernani Magalhães. However, my aim is not to establish a ‘hard’
conclusion that these arguments all fail; rather, it is just to characterize some
features of the locatedness (location) of such universals, including their notorious
‘multiple location’. In the final section of the chapter, I consider concrete polyadic
universals, whose locatedness clearly is especially problematic: for example, they
obviously cannot be in their instances, since they hold between them. I briefly
sketch Armstrong’s three suggestions for a way out of this predicament.
I tentatively endorse his suggestion that spatial and temporal relations constitute
spacetime, such that it is a category-mistake to ask for their location.
Part III—The Unity of States of Affairs
Chapter 9: The Problem of Unity and Relational Internalism
In this chapter, I explain and motivate the problem of unity in non-metaphorical
terms further than in Chap. 1, and I provide a solution to it. My general approach to
the problem is what I call relational internalism (the unifier of a state of affairs is a
relation of some sort in it). I identify a species of this approach, common inter-
nalism, and consider it in some detail. Unfortunately, it inevitably leads to
Bradley’s regress, which, as I argue in detail in the following chapter, is vicious. In
the course of analysing common internalism, I explicate two important meta-
physical principles underlying it, two principles which jointly are critical in gen-
erating the regress. It turns out that extant versions of relational internalism face the
dilemma of either not solving the problem of unity at all or succeeding in this
halfway and then leading to Bradley’s regress. However, I propose a novel version
of relational internalism, which I call self-relating internalism, on which a unique,
formal constituent relation, the U*-relation, unifies a state of affairs by relating itself
to the other constituents of the state of affairs. It thereby solves the problem of unity
without giving rise to Bradley’s regress.
Chapter 10: The Unity of States of Affairs and Bradley’s Regress
This chapter is intimately related to the previous one, but it can to a large extent be
read independently of it. In it, I discuss a number of issues raised in Chap. 9 in more
detail. This includes the basic version of relational internalism, common internalism
and the ‘infinitary reading’ of it, on which it is co-extensional with Bradley’s
regress. It further includes an attempt to apply Francesco Orilia’s ‘internalist’ versus
‘externalist’ versions of Bradley’s regress to common internalism. However, my
preferred analysis of Bradley’s regress involves a novel tack construing it as an
argument. One advantage of this approach is that it will demonstrate precisely how
the two crucial metaphysical principles from the analysis of common internalism in
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Chap. 9 are at work in the regress. Furthermore, it will enable me to show in detail
that it indeed is a vicious regress. And finally, it enables me to show exactly how
and why self-relating internalism solves the problem of unity without leading to
Bradley’s regress. I defend this approach to Bradley’s regress (and the associated
problem of unity) against recent criticism by Howard Peacock. In the two remaining
sections of the chapter, following a review of self-relating internalism, I explore the
nature of the U*-relation, including how the phenomenon of self-relating differs
from reflexivity, whether or not U* is multigrade, and finally how U* compares and
contrasts with material relations.
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